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Introduction
Latin America has been one of the most prosperous regions among Emerging Economies in terms of 
many indicators, including per-capita income. For many years, it grew at a faster rate than the rest of 
the world, and GDP per capita exceeded the average for the world. It was and is a source of primary 
commodities and a relatively small contributor to 
environmental degradation (with the exception of 
deforestation in the Amazon) relative to other major 
regions of the world. It also has acquired a fairly 
high  educational  level.  However,  particularly  in 
recent decades, Latin America has not managed 
to keep up with other Emerging Markets. The more 
dynamic Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in 
Asia in particular, have not only caught up with the 
region but are also leaving it behind. These coun-
tries have become “convergers”,1 i.e. their incomes 
have converged with the advanced economies. In 
turn, Latin American economies, with the excep-
tion of Chile, do not fall into this category and have 
been losing ground not only with respect to these 
countries but with respect to many others in the 
developing world. While there are many theories 
that attempt to explain this phenomenon, the sim-
ple fact is that Latin America’s growth performance 
has been mediocre when compared to other regions.
Today, Latin America is an average region in the world. It had an income level in 2009 of PPP 
US$10,544 compared to a global average of PPP US$10,278.2 At market exchange rates, the aver-
age income of a Latin American is a bit lower than the world average: $7,028 compared to $8,531 (in 
1   Converging  is understood as  moving rapidly toward the levels of income of the advanced economies, and away from the current stagnation, characteristic 
of the middle-income trap
2    Using current PPP dollars. 
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2009).3 The remarkable fact about Latin America is that its income level in constant dollars is estimated 
at 15.5 percent of that of the United States in 20094 which compares to 17.0 percent in 1965. In brief, 
Latin America is close to the global average in living standards, and it has neither converged nor 
diverged from the United States over a 44 year period. Latin America seems to be stuck.
The recent economic crisis hit Latin American economies (with a few exceptions like Mexico) to a 
somewhat milder extent than many other regions, and there are good indications that they are recov-
ering well. Still, the weaknesses that characterize the region have become more evident, in terms of 
commodity dependence, volatile private financing, and serious issues of income distribution, equity 
and inclusion. Actions to strengthen the medium-term performance of the region are essential.  
This book traces out a scenario for the global economy that suggests that Latin America’s busi-
ness-as-usual average performance will not be sufficient for the region to retain its global output share. 
It will steadily shrink, because in practice its performance in recent years has been below average. 
Latin America can of course do better than it has in the past. This book presents a scenario for 
convergence—with growth at 6.5 percent per year (at market exchange rates). Such a growth rate 
could be achieved if four of the major Latin American economies join Chile and manage to achieve the 
same rate of catch-up TFP growth as in some other converging developing countries or if a majority of 
countries does moderately well. That suggests it is a feasible scenario.  
But the region and its leaders need to raise their sights on economic growth and promote a vision 
of a vibrant, fast-growing economic region where high investment rates and rapid increases in total 
factor productivity are the objects of national policy. The region will need to refocus its objectives and 
to be pragmatic rather than ideological about it in order to re-emerge from its state of relative comfort, 
complacency and, in some cases, unfortunately, even sleepiness. While no two regions are equivalent, 
the example of East Asia, even with its own vulnerabilities, provides the most important lessons.
Historical Comparative Performance
An analysis of Latin America’s past performance with a long-term perspective shows that its posi-
tion within the world economy has fluctuated significantly. Over the course of a century and a half, 
Latin America grew at a faster rate than the world economy. Its share of world GDP doubled from 4.4 
percent around the turn of the twentieth century to 8.7 percent in the 1970s; it reached a peak of 9.5 
percent of world GDP by 1981, with GDP per-capita exceeding the world average by some 10 percent, 
during the third quarter of the century (Table 1 and Figure 1).5 Subsequently, growth rates of overall 
GDP and per capita GDP lagged the rest of the world, and per capita GDP fell below the world aver-
age (Figure 2).
As can be observed, the decline in the share of Latin America in world GDP has been far from 
smooth, even though the rate of growth of per capita income has leveled off, compared to the most 
3    Using 2009 constant dollars.
4    Using 2009 constant dollars
5    These numbers are subject to considerable debate and are long-term estimations of purchasing power parity (PPP), based on longer-term historical stud-
ies, like those of A. Maddison. Estimates based on values unadjusted for PPP, as most of the estimates made in this study for the last forty years may give a 
somewhat smaller ratio of per capita GDP for the region compared to the rest of the world.23
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Average Annual Growth Rate
1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1974-1998 1999-2008
GDP
Latin America 3.5 3.4 5.4 3.0 3.4
World 2.1 1.8 4.9 3.0 4.0
GDP per Capita
Latin America 1.8 1.4 2.6 1.0 2.1
World 1.3 0.9 2.9 1.3 2.8
Share of Latin America in 
World GDP (in percent) 4.4 7.8 8.7 8.7 8.1
Ratio GDP per capita Latin 
America/World (in percent) 97 119 110 96 95
Source: A. Maddison, The World economy, a Millennial perspective, 2004; IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2009; and own estimates.
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dynamic areas of the world economy. Moreover, the region’s share in world GDP has fluctuated in 
line with commodity prices (Figure 3).6 Large Latin American countries have also declined relative to 
their counterparts in Asia. This is reflected in the trajectory of per capita income for the largest Latin 
American countries compared to East Asia, and particularly to Japan and the NICs—a group that 
includes Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—as shown in Figure 4.
 Volatility has been an adverse factor and is reflected in a high percentage of years of low growth 
in the region relative to others. This can be observed at the percentage of years since 1980 that the 
region’s growth rates were below 1 and 2 percent respectively (Figure 5). Only more recently has the 
growth performance tended to improve in terms of volatility.
While growth performance has been far from stellar, many indicators for Latin America have 
remained relatively strong, including the Human Development Index.7 Per capita income remains rea-
sonably high, the region has benefitted from the major booms in commodities observed over recent 
decades, and many individuals in the region have been lifted from abject poverty in the last decade 
and a half. 
Latin America’s opening to international trade after years of isolation has resulted in greater capital 
inflows and the continent has reaped some of the benefits of a globalized world. Foreign direct invest-
ment has been attracted to the region’s abundant natural resources. The region has a reasonably 
well-educated young and growing labor force, and it stands to benefit from a demographic dividend in 
6     The more comprehensive index, including fuels would correspond much closer to the fluctuations in GDP share, but does not extend as far back as the 
non-fuel commodity index.
7     The Human Development Index was developed by the UNDP for its Human Development Reports. 
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the short run. Latin America’s labor force should 
grow by more than 1.5 percent a year over the 
next 15 years, with population growth at just 
over 1.0 percent. So, the ratio of working age 
population to total population is on the upswing 
in the next two decades, although it will change 
subsequently.
Poverty has been reduced after years of 
difficulty associated with the lost decade of the 
eighties, a period of adjustment and reconver-
sion that was implemented in the 1990s with a 
period of macroeconomic strengthening and 
structural reforms. The numbers are now in line 
with what can be expected to be consistent 
with Latin America per capita income. 
Now, after many years of misguided poli-
cies  and  poor  performance,  the  region  has 
much stronger fundamentals. Today, the issues 
of inflation, balance of payments fragility, and 
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broad  fiscal  imbalances  seem  to  have  been 
overcome, even though not everywhere and not 
permanently. While the recovery from the cur-
rent crisis seems to be proceeding at a relatively 
slow pace, the region possibly suffered less 
than most, with a few notable exceptions, like 
Mexico. While this may have reflected to some 
extent a rebound of commodity prices, it also is 
accounted for by the regained strength and the 
relatively solid performance of a well-managed, 
although small, financial system.8
These  developments  have  placed  the 
region’s economies in a complacent plateau, 
focusing on their progress with respect to other 
Latin American countries and not with respect 
to  the  world.  But  underlying  these  achieve-
ments, Latin America is falling behind as previ-
ously noted, and the prospects for a sustained 
catch up, as happened in the past, are poor without a change in strategic attitude. The current attitude 
will lead to a continued and continuous decline in the importance of Latin America in the world, and 
with increasing gaps in terms of per capita income. 
While progress has been made regarding poverty, income distribution in Latin America shows the 
highest concentration, with correspondingly the highest Gini coefficients of any region (Figure 6). The 
poverty numbers suggest that the problems of distribution are between the highest income earners 
and the rest of the total population including the growing regional middle class, and not the poorest 
of the poor. The actual picture is even more marked, however, as the Gini statistics fail to capture total 
income, particularly the unrecorded income of the very rich. To some extent, this reflects a significant 
level of exclusion at the lower levels of income and high concentration at the top, with average wealth 
levels among the very rich well in excess of that in other areas of the world, including in the US and 
8    The depth and the duration of the 2008-09 global recession will remain debated amongst academics and policy makers. Many took the experience of 
the Great Depression as indicative of what may happen. Then, as well as in the post-World War II recession, growth exceeded its long run average during a 
recovery phase before returning to trend, compensating for the down period. There was little impact on permanent long-run income levels. But that period 
was exceptional, given the level of destruction of human and physical capital during the subsequent war. Separating the “natural” recovery from the Great 
Depression from the effects of World War II spending is almost impossible. The relevance of that recovery for the current crisis may well be questioned.
     Notwithstanding, the post-War experience with recessions is that as the recovery gathers steam, countries grow faster than potential output. In general 
most analysts do not foresee a permanent impact of the current recession. As the crisis abates, growth is likely to exceed its long run average during a 
recovery phase before returning to trend, compensating for the down period.  
     The IMF has reviewed the history of financial crises and concludes that while medium term growth recovers to trend levels, output remains below trend, 
by an average of 10 percent. However, the IMF analysis is simply a description of what has happened compared to pre-crisis trends. This kind of analysis 
has a bias:  the pre-crisis trend (which the IMF takes as the period covering the ten to three years prior to the crisis) may be part of a longer-term boom 
which in turn precipitates the crisis, and should not be counted as the long-term trend growth rate. All these caveats underline an essential point: the 
forward-looking figures are scenarios and not a projection or forecast.   
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database, 2009; and IMF 
Non-feul Commodity Price Index, 2010.
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Europe.9 Moreover, serious inclusion problems remain for ethnic and cultural groups of indigenous 
people and afro-descendants. 
Latin America’s increasing openness to world trade has been a positive step toward increasing 
capital inflows. Gains have been concentrated in areas of traditional comparative advantage and not 
in new and more dynamic areas. The degree of openness, though significantly higher than in the past,   
is still much lower than the NICs and other countries in Asia (Figure 7). 
Economic growth has accelerated in recent years but current policies seem to allow for an increase 
in income of no more than 3.5 percent a year. Just to preserve Latin America’s share in world GDP, 
economic growth would have to increase to an average 5 percent a year. This cannot be achieved 
within the current strategic and policy framework, or with current levels of savings and investment. 
Productivity and its Effect on Performance
A key underlying factor in Latin America’s performance has been the region’s productivity, as reflected 
in the measure of total factor productivity (TFP). The components of growth of Latin America, other 
selected regions, and the world are shown in Table 2. Latin America’s GDP growth has been very 
similar to that of the world but the components of growth are very different. While Latin America has 
registered higher growth rates in both capital and labor, its performance with respect to TFP-negative 
growth has been much poorer.
In 1980, the region’s TFP averaged around 40 percent of the US, which was high relative to other 
developing countries. As shown in Figure 8, TFP has remained virtually stagnant over the past three 
9     An annual survey by Cap Gemini, a consultancy,  and Merryl Lynch, now owned by Bank of America, shows that the average level of assets of high worth 
individuals with assets in excess of $1 million (excluding their residence, and land holdings) in Latin America, is  two times higher than the average world-wide.
Source: calculations based on Ferreira and Ravallion, 2008.
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decades. In 1987, South Korea’s technology level was almost exactly the same as Brazil’s, the tech-
nology leader in Latin America in the 1970s; Malaysia’s level was at 60 percent and Thailand’s at 30 
percent of Brazil’s. By 2009, Korea’s TFP was 60 percent higher, Malaysia had almost caught up, and 
Thailand’s was at over 55 percent. Furthermore, the rates of change in TFP of Latin American econo-
mies compared very poorly to China and India; while China’s TFP more than quadrupled and India’s 
Capital Labor TFP GDP (PPP) GDP (MER)
Developed Countries 2.93% 0.95% 0.76% 2.45% 2.40%
Developing Asia 6.36% 1.92% 3.60% 7.08% 6.09%
Developing Middle 
East and North Africa 3.32% 3.53% -0.38% 3.21% 1.82%
Sub Saharan Africa 2.56% 2.84% 0.13% 2.95% 1.64%
Latin America 3.17% 2.73% -0.14% 2.74% 2.77%
World 2.34% 1.78% 0.79% 3.06% 2.78%
Source: Authors’ Caluculations
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doubled, the TFP in the Latin America regions was virtually stagnant (Figure 9.)
The region’s poor TFP performance reflects a number of factors. Most importantly, the low level of 
competition—domestically and through trade—has limited the incentives for higher productivity and 
competitiveness. This may also explain the low level of investment in the region compared with many 
Source: Estimations by Homi Kharas. 
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other parts of the world. New capital in itself does not entail improved TFP. However, the technol-
ogy incorporated with new higher-quality investment, and the accompanying improvement in human 
capital will result in higher productivity and growth. Thus, the low level of investment has resulted in a 
slower process of innovation.
Other aspects with direct impact on TFP include the poor overall performance with respect to the 
quality of education relative to international standards (Figure 10), and low technological readiness 
compared to other regions (Figure 11). The quality of infrastructure, reflecting the low levels of invest-
ment, compares poorly with other regions (Figure 12). Economies in the region are also hampered 
by the business environment, as is captured in the Ease of Doing Business indicator (Figure 13). The 
regulatory environment has resulted in the highest degree of informality of all regions (Figure 14). All of 
these factors have contributed to the poor competitiveness of the region (Figure 15). 
In addition, the holdings of assets abroad, excluding direct investment by local companies, is 
very significant for some of the countries in the region, sometimes exceeding the level of debt and 
FDI of the countries themselves. These holdings had been a reaction to poor policies—only recently 
corrected—and detract from the growth potential of the region. Should sound macroeconomic poli-
cies persist, repatriation of these holdings could be a major source of the much needed capital and 
technology transformation.
A Focus on Ideology versus Outcome
A main characteristic of the economic history of Latin America has been the emphasis on ideology and 
ideological policies, as opposed to Asia’s emphasis on outcomes. Speaking in simplistic terms, the 
approach to growth in many Latin American countries can be construed as “get the policies right and 
growth will follow”. That applies particularly to macroeconomic policies and Latin America has an envi-
able track record of finally putting its fiscal and monetary house in order, with Chile leading the pack of 
those countries developing fiscally responsible rules. But the results from such an approach have not 
been fully reflected in higher growth. Macroeconomic stability is a necessary component. However, for 
this to take place, there is a need for pragmatism and to have ‘rapid growth’ as the objective, which 
also means better education, infrastructure, etc.; and government support for better technology. Chile 
estimates its potential output growth to have fallen to 3.9 percent. For a country at its income level, a 
long-term growth of 5 percent per capita should be achievable.
The attitude in Latin America stands at odds with the leadership on growth that is one of the 
ingredients of long-term success identified by the Growth Commission. The Commission highlights 
the benefits of a national purpose in pursuing rapid growth, endorsed and sustained in a consensus 
among political parties. In East Asia, which is recovering rapidly from the Great Recession, the past 
year has been one of determined efforts at structural reform and reinvention to take advantage of the 
changing world environment. It is that single-minded focus on growth which appears to be one secret 
of Asian success stories. East Asian approaches can be characterized as “set a growth target and 
adjust policies to make sure it happens”. There is a pragmatism that serves to overcome deeply-held 
beliefs when the growth engine is threatened.31
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A major lesson of the East Asian success in the past fifty years is that Latin America needs to pur-
sue a longer term and more pragmatic and non-ideological set of policies, based on market principles 
and measured government intervention, but with the understanding that the policies should be aim-
ing at attaining commonly agreed sustainable social and economic outcomes. Under this pragmatic 
approach, policies and the mix of government-private sector association would be adjusted as needed 
to realize the outcomes sought under the shared vision (while respecting the principles of good gov-
ernance, transparency, and with a good understanding of the costs of these policies).
Of equal importance, there must be a consensus on policies and objectives within the region 
toward better integrating production processes across regional economies. This is in contrast to the 
current practice, where policies in one country are introduced at the expense of others rather than 
seeking to exploit the comparative advantages of each country for an adequate integration with the 
rest of the world.
In summary, Latin America presents a mixed picture, but with a clear tendency toward a loss of 
relevance and relative importance in the world economy. Today, Latin America is becoming an increas-
ingly left-behind continent, for good and for bad reasons:
•	 The region has been lagging in terms of growth, with the possible exception of Chile, Peru, 
and other small countries. Even Chile’s growth performance is slowing.
•	 With the clear exception of Haiti, now even more so, and to a lesser extent Bolivia, Honduras 
and Nicaragua, Latin America is too prosperous for continued concessional aid, which is 
good in terms of poverty but not so in terms of financing.
•	 There are no major crises of macroeconomic management, and even those that still are 
present to some extent, like in Argentina, Ecuador and Venezuela, are generally more man-
ageable and less traumatic than in the past. This is good from a fundamental growth perspec-
tive, but may reduce the incentives for reform in some of the countries as it is not seen as 
urgent.
•	 The times of easy growth have led to relatively high degrees of urbanization, moderately good 
levels of basic education and a limited technology gap. 
However, the earlier gains are being eroded. Moreover, the region seems to be mired in the Middle 
Income Trap (see Box 1):
•	 Too rich to be globally competitive in basic manufacturing.
•	 Too poor to be competitive in advanced materials and innovation.
It is necessary to make fundamental policy changes, strengthen and rationalize institutions, and 
streamline the political process to a significant degree. The required changes are doable, but they 
require pragmatism and consensus on objectives and, of equal importance, significant and drastic 
action now.
The Prospects for the Long Term
Latin America’s per capita GDP in 2009 was US$10,544 (in current PPP dollars), compared with 
$36,953 for the advanced economies, $13,408 for Central and Eastern Europe and $4,436 for 33
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Developing Asia. Based on this performance, Latin America is clearly a middle income region, but 
far behind the lowest “advanced economy” in the IMF’s list—Portugal with a GDP (PPP) per capita 
of $21,729. Existing policies and conditions in the region have been consistent with a rate of growth 
well below average for the rest of the world. While growth of income per capita can be considered 
reasonable by many, at somewhat more than 2 percent a year, the picture is far from satisfactory when 
compared to the rest of the world.  
This study makes projections through 2040, on the basis of a world growth model described 
Few countries sustain high growth for more than a generation, and even fewer continue their high growth 
rates once they reach middle income status. The Commission on Growth and Development’s recent review 
of growth in developing countries (The Growth Report, A. Michael Spence, 2008) identified just 13 countries that 
sustained growth of more than 7 percent for at least 25 years in the postwar period. They have five common 
characteristics: openness to the global economy in knowledge and trade; macroeconomic stability; a 
“future orientation”, exemplified by high rates of saving and investment; a reliance on markets and market-
based prices to allocate resources; and leadership committed to growth and inclusion with a reasonable 
capacity for administration. These success factors, deep-rooted in local institutions, are necessary, but not 
sufficient, for continued growth. Some countries with these characteristics grew fast, but could not sustain 
that growth. 
        Even among the 13 star performers, growth has been uneven. Some East Asian middle income 
countries suffered severe setbacks in 1997-1998, and may not recover past rapid growth. Brazil, whose 
growth performance between 1950 and 1980 qualified it as a growth star, then suffered disastrous 
inflationary episodes and low growth in the 1980s and 1990s. Reaching incomes associated with the 
advanced countries is uncommon: only a few of the high-growth countries did so including the NICs. More 
common is for growth to slow markedly on reaching middle income. Many Latin American and Middle 
Eastern countries suffered the fate of falling into a slow-growth trap once they reached middle-income 
levels. 
     Some features differentiating middle income from low income growth are clear. Growth tends to become 
more capital intensive and skill intensive. The domestic market expands and becomes a more important 
engine, especially for service growth. Wages start to rise, most rapidly for highly skilled workers, and 
shortages can emerge. The traditional low-wage manufacturing for export model does not work well for 
middle income countries. They seem to become trapped, unless they change strategies and move up 
the value chain. Cost advantages in labor-intensive sectors, such as the manufactured exports that once 
drove growth, start to decline in comparison with lower wage poor country producers. At the same time, 
middle income countries do not have the property rights, contract enforcement, capital markets, track 
record of successful venture capital and invention, or critical mass of highly skilled people to grow through 
major innovations, like affluent countries. Caught between these two groups, middle income countries can 
become trapped without a viable high-growth strategy. 
     This seems to be what has happened to Latin America. In many countries, wages are too high to be 
globally competitive in basic manufacturing—the collapse of Latin America’s garments producers after 
protection was withdrawn is proof of that.  Yet, Latin America does not have the R&D and innovation 
capabilities that allow it to develop new products in advanced areas (exceptions are by now familiar: 
Latin America in the Middle Income Trap?
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in detail in Chapter 2. As a long-run model, the results and assumptions are stylized, and are not 
intended to predict the future, but to provide a context for policy formulation and reform. 
Global Growth Results
The global economy fell to $57.9 trillion in 2009, measured at market exchange rates10, dominated by 
the United States with $14.3 trillion, just over one-quarter of the global total. In current PPP terms, glo-
bal output is almost $70 trillion. North America (24 percent), Europe (27 percent) and Asia (34 percent) 
dominate the world economy. Latin America’s share today is about 8.5 percent.
The BRICs accounted for about 24 percent of 2009 global output in PPP terms, a post-war histori-
cal high. This is a recent phenomenon, one driven largely by China, which has expanded its global 
market share to almost 13 percent. Even at market exchange rates, China is set to overtake Japan 
as the world’s second largest economy, either this year or next. Importantly, the rich countries of the 
world only account for 53 percent of global output now, compared to 70 percent in 1990.  
By 2040, 30 years from now, the global economy may be $258 trillion in 2005 PPP dollars.11 Such 
a world is very different from the one we see today. It is significantly wealthier, with per capita incomes 
averaging $30,000 as compared to $8,000 today. The economic center of gravity would shift to Asia, 
which accounts today for 34 percent of global activity, but by 2040 could account for 61 percent of 
global output. Three giant economies, China, India and Japan, would lead Asia’s resurgence. But 
other large countries like Indonesia and Vietnam would also have significant economic mass. Even 
Thailand and Malaysia could have economies larger than France has today.
The rise of Asia would not be unprecedented. Indeed, it would bring Asia’s economic share into 
line with its share of world population and restore the geographical balance of global economic activity 
to that prevailing in the 18th and early 19th centuries, before the Industrial Revolution led to the great 
divergence of incomes across countries. 
The converse of Asia’s rise would be a fall in the share of the G7 economies. Their global income 
share has already fallen to new post-World War II lows, and by 2040 it could be just 21 percent. 
To appreciate the likelihood of this enormous change, consider the following facts. Taking out the 
effect of general inflation, the global economy reached $20 trillion, in terms of 2005 PPP dollars, in 
1977.  It took 19 years to double to $40 trillion by 1996—with 3.6 percent annual growth. Over the next 
10 years, from 1996 to 2006, annual growth has been 3.7 percent. To get to $258 trillion by 2040, 
global growth would need to be 4.7 percent. 
The reason for expecting an acceleration of global growth is that the share of rapidly growing 
economies has now risen to almost one-half of total output, while the share of slow growing countries 
has fallen. As faster growing countries also tend to have appreciating exchange rates, global output 
growth at market prices will accelerate simply because the fastest growing economies in the world 
(China and India) are also becoming ever-larger shares of global output at market exchange rates.
10    Using 2009 constant dollars. 
11    Natural resource constraints and the effects of climate change have been ignored in this scenario. This may prove to be quite unrealistic but to take these 
into account would require a far more sophisticated model of global growth. 35
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The model assumes that “advanced” country real potential output growth will slow in the next 30 
years to 2.3 percent, from 2.5 percent over the last 10 years. Meanwhile the “convergers” could also 
slow to 8.2 percent, from the 8.4 percent over the last 10 years.
One reason that developing countries are growing faster than developed countries is that they are 
younger, still at an early phase in their demographic transition. Global demographic shifts are inexora-
bly changing the distribution of global economic activity. Today’s rich countries accounted for 22 per-
cent of the world’s people in 1965, but only account for 15 percent today, and their share is forecast to 
shrink to 13 percent of the world total by 2040. Overall, the world will add 2 billion people by 2040. But 
the population in today’s rich countries will grow by only an estimated 100 million. Ninety-five percent 
of the population increase (excluding migration) will be in developing countries, mostly in Africa.
Latin America under the Business-as-Usual Scenario
How does Latin America fare under the business-as-usual scenario? Not surprisingly, the answer is 
average. In 2005 PPP terms, Latin America may grow by 2.2 percent per capita in the long-term, but 
the world will be growing faster. Latin America’s income may stay at a constant ratio to advanced 
countries, with Mexico and Brazil possibly posting growth rates close to that of the United States, but 
this performance means that Latin America may slowly fade in global relevance, especially in compari-
son to East and South Asia. At market exchange rates, a similar pattern holds. Latin America simply 
grows more or less at the same pace as the United States, and falls behind the rest of the world. This 
is all the more disappointing as Latin America is potentially able to enjoy a demographic dividend in 
the coming years—its labor force will grow more rapidly than its population for the next thirty years.
Table 3 shows a trajectory of key variables for Latin America and the rest of the world under this 
business-as-usual scenario. The table is deliberately stylized. It shows how a business-as-usual sce-
nario implies a growing gap between Latin America and much of the rest of the world, especially the 
advanced countries. The table also shows the possibilities for Latin America, exemplified by Chile. 
Chile is the only Latin American country in the sample to meet the criterion for inclusion in the “con-
vergers” category of having a track record of at least 3.5 percent per capita income growth over the 
past twenty-five years, at least prior to the recent earthquake, and as recognized by its accession to 
the OECD.12
But Brazil, Mexico and other Latin American countries do not meet the criterion. What is shown 
in the business-as-usual scenario is what would happen if they continue down a path of relatively low 
TFP growth and relatively low capital investment. At the end of the day, the policies which will generate 
convergence depend on these two key variables.
Latin America Convergence Scenario and its Payoff
If a few key economies in Latin America could enter the club of “convergers” it could make a radical 
difference to the region’s prospects. To investigate this, the model was re-run with four major Latin 
12    It is important to point out that Mexico is also an OECD member, and has been characterized recently by a non-converging performance.36
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American countries moving into the “convergers” category, meaning they undertake the policy reforms 
needed to benefit from catch-up growth. The scenario is incomplete in the sense that investment rates 
in the selected countries would probably also increase in such a scenario, but this is not modeled. Nor 
is the spill-over effect onto neighboring countries which could also be substantial.  
Two large and two mid-sized countries are selected as the four newly-converging Latin American 
economies, joining Chile in this classification. The choice is arbitrary, and implies that countries 
2009 2040
Global Output (PPP) $62.8 trillion $258 trillion
   Latin America share 8.7% 5.3%
Global Output growth (PPP) a. 3.75% 4.47%
   Latin America 3.03% 2.91%
Average Income (real GDP at 2009 US$)
   World $8,500 $30,500
   Rich countries $40,000 $85,700
   Latin America $7,000 $15,500
   Mexico $8,000 $19,400
   Brazil $9,300 $20,200
   Chile $9,500 $77,400
Rank in world (absolute GDP) size
   Brazil 10 16
   Mexico 12 18
Capital-Labor ratio (per person)
   World $32,700 $79,600
   Rich countries $146,000 $325,000
   LATAM $20,000 $42,400
TFP (US 2009=100)
   United States 100 150.3
   Mexico 31.9 47.7
   Brazil 29.9 44.6
   Chile 37.8 91.6
a. Growth rate taken from the preceding 25 year period.
Note: All figures are in constant 2009 US$. 
Source: World Bank - WDI, Brookings Institution, and author’s estimates.
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representing seventy percent of the region’s economy adopt good policies. By 2040, the difference 
to the region is enormous. The growth acceleration to a level of 6.5 percent at market exchange rates 
is simply the result of faster TFP growth in the selected countries. With catch-up, selected countries 
could expect TFP growth of 2-3 percent per year. By 2040, the major economies would have made 
significant progress in terms of technology.
The convergence scenario indicates the dependence of the Latin American region on the per-
formance of its major economies, as well as the critical issue of capitalizing on the advantages of 
backwardness in raising growth. Recall that the convergence scenario simply attributes to major Latin 
American economies the same rate of growth of technological catch-up as in the rest of the converg-
ing world. That is to say, it is an estimate of what can be considered as the potential growth for these 
countries. Compounded over thirty years, the impact is significant. Regional output could be three 
times higher by 2040, and per capita incomes could be higher by almost that much. If the region could 
achieve these kinds of growth rates, it would have income levels of about half of that of the US by 
2040. The richer countries of the region would catch up rapidly with the United States.
Figures 16 and 17 show a comparison of different scenarios—not based on running the model 
of the global economy—for illustrative purposes. As compared to a GDP per capita of $13,000 in the 
business-as-usual scenario, the region would reach a level of over $40,000 under convergence. The 
region’s share of the global economy in 2040 would be as higher than 10 percent under the conver-
gence scenario versus only 4 percent under business-as-usual.
The convergence scenario presented above is far from easy to achieve. Latin America has seen 
many examples where fast-growing countries suddenly found themselves in a crisis, frequently self-
made, and not growing at the rate they used to. Argentina over more than half a century, Mexico after 
Source:  Estimates by authors - 2010.
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the 1960s, Brazil more recently, and even the region’s stellar performer, Chile, have seen a decline in 
growth.
Brazil provides a good illustration. It grew at almost 6 percent a year for almost a century. In 1965 it 
was a prosperous developing country with a per capita income of $1,800 (2008 dollars). It continued to 
grow until 1978, when it reached $5,500 per capita, with average growth of almost 9.5 percent a year. 
But then Brazil entered a period of relative stagnation. It did not regain its 1978 per capita income until 
1995 and then only briefly in the burst of activity that followed the end of high inflation and the begin-
ning of stabilization. It was only with the commodity boom in 2006 that Brazil again surpassed its 1978 
income. But, the current global economic crisis and resultant drop in commodity prices has again 
blunted, though temporarily, this recent resurgence. After a century of growth, Brazil spent nearly 30 
years mired in the middle income trap without further improvement in its average living standards. 
Although recent growth has been better, Brazil has still not demonstrated a track record of sustained 
fast growth that would allow it to converge rapidly with advanced economies.
Three assumptions support the convergence scenario: 
1.  The world is in the midst of a major restructuring—with the relative economic weight of devel-
oping countries in general and Asia in particular, set to continue becoming larger—and this 
restructuring can continue to proceed peacefully. 
2.  The current financial turmoil is being managed well, with global growth resuming and the 
existence of firmer principles governing the financial world. Still, there are considerable doubts 
about the pace of economic growth in the years ahead, with some likelihood that the average 
rate of potential growth for the world may decline. 
3.  The difficulties that many Latin American economies have had in becoming advanced are due 
to policy and strategy shortcomings—and are not immutable on account of natural, social, 
and ethnic characteristics.
IV. A Strategic Framework for Convergence: 
A Shared, More Ambitious Vision for the Region
Given Latin America’s rich natural endowments, there is no reason why Latin America cannot do as 
well as East Asia. Indeed, as demonstrated by the successful Asian countries, the region’s destiny is 
firmly dependent on its own actions. Only through its own efforts will the region prosper. To do so, all 
concerned—governments, bureaucracy, the business community, academia, think tanks, media, civil 
society and other opinion makers as well as multilateral agencies active in the region—must adopt a 
laser-like focus on simultaneously achieving a much more inclusive and equitable society and much 
higher economic growth. The region’s leaders must aim much higher, be pragmatic and focus single-
mindedly on achieving this vision. Such a vision, and a sincere commitment to realizing it, must be 
shared both within the countries themselves and across the region as a whole. This commonly shared 
vision must be accompanied by a very different mindset across the political and social landscape: 
abandonment of the past ideological divides and adoption of pragmatism, as has been the case in 39
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Embraer in Brazil, wine and fruits in Chile and Argentina). 
Latin America’s loss of its long standing position as the most prosperous and promising developing region 
is best illustrated by comparing its economic and social development relative to East Asia in general, and 
the so called NICs more specifically. 
Between 1965 and 2009, the per capita income of the NICs grew at an average annual rate of 6.8 percent, 
while Latin America recorded a growth rate of only 3.7 percent. As a result, in terms of per capita income, 
the NICs—that lagged well behind Latin America in 1965 ($1,778 vs. $3,403)—leapfrogged over the region 
($20,308 vs. $7,028 in 2009).1 This illustrates how the most dynamic economies in Asia, now joined by 
China and India, have continued to converge with the United States, while most Latin economies have 
become mired in the middle-income trap. Other striking differences between East Asia and Latin America 
include: 
•	 All successful East Asian countries, as well as China and India, have achieved major gains in total 
factor productivity (TFP) while Latin American countries have remained stagnant. The two largest 
economies (Brazil and Mexico) have even regressed somewhat.
•	 East Asian countries have much higher savings rates (51 percent vs. 23 percent of GDP) and invest-
ment rates than Latin America. 
•	 East Asia has placed much greater emphasis on human development and put a high premium on 
meritocracy in its education system. It has achieved much higher educational standards and gradu-
ates a significantly higher number of engineers and scientists than Latin America, in relative terms.
•	 East Asia’s investment, public as well as private, in infrastructure has been much higher than in Latin 
America, and it has deeper financial markets, particularly non-bank financial institutions.
•	 NICs have much more open economies than Latin America, with total trade to GDP ratios of 159 
percent vs. 41.5 percent for Latin America.
•	 The structure of production in East Asia has changed dramatically in the past forty years with the 
region becoming the manufacturing hub of the world, while Latin American economies remain highly 
dependent on commodities and agricultural products.  
•	 Even as East Asian economies moved from low-income to middle-income and finally to upper 
middle-income status their income distribution and other social indicators have remained much 
more equitable than Latin America, which has the highest disparities of any region in the world. East 
Asia’s more equitable distribution of incomes and assets allowed it to develop a large middle class 
as soon as the countries achieved middle-income status and this fast growing middle class became 
an engine of innovation, entrepreneurship and domestic consumption that fuelled further economic 
growth (see box on page 14). In contrast, Latin America’s huge income disparities led to a much 
slower development of its middle class at similar national per capita income levels, even though the 
numbers are far from small.
•	 In the last decade, the institutional business and investment climate has been much more favorable 
in East Asia, thus helping to generate the growth momentum that can be observed today. The proc-
ess has been market driven, helped but not explained by the emergence of China and its strong 
connections with some of the more advanced countries in the region.
1     In constant 2009 US$
What Makes East Asia Different From Latin America?
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East Asia (see also Box 2). 
Given the diversity of the region and differing resource endowments, human capital, structure and 
efficiency of individual countries as well as vastly differing institutional capacities, it is neither prudent 
nor possible to lay out a detailed strategy for achieving this common vision across the entire region. 
That can only be done at the level of each individual country. 
However, learning from the region’s own experiences in the past forty years and contrasting them 
with East Asia, it is possible to define the broad contours of the strategy required to achieve this more 





Most importantly, actions under these three pillars will need to be underpinned by improved gov-
ernance and accountability for results. As with many developing regions, Latin America’s Achilles 
Source: Centennial Group.
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heel—the biggest hurdle to Latin America achieving a sustaining a more inclusive society and higher 
economic growth rate over the next thirty years—is its poor governance in all its facets.
Only through the pursuit of this three-pillar strategy will it be possible to visualize a prosperous 
Latin America. 
1. More Inclusion
Latin America has recently made important strides in improving the conditions of its poor people. 
Nonetheless, income and wealth distribution remains highly skewed. Politically and socially, the cur-
rent situation is unsustainable. Tackling structural inequities is therefore essential from the point of 
view of equity. But, as 
demonstrated by Asia, 
achieving a more equi-
table society is equally 
relevant to forging sup-
port for sound policies 
and  thus  sustaining 
growth over the longer 
term,  including  by 
expanding the size of 
the middle class. 
With  significant 
numbers  of  Latin 
Americans  not  fully 
integrated  into  the 
mainstream  economy 
and society (indigenous people, afro-descendants and, to a large extent, women) and with current 
high degrees of informality, in the past the benefits of economic growth have not reached many cit-
izens. This particularly affected those without European ethnicity, leading to the disillusionment of 
large proportions of the population with the current economic policies and institutions. Only significant 
progress toward a more inclusive society can lead to realistic prospects of sustained and sustainable 
growth over time for Latin America, as had been achieved in Asia.
Thus, contrary to the view that there is a trade-off between growth and equity, striving for a more 
inclusive society promises a win-win situation. The fundamental approach to achieving a more inclu-
sive society will involve the removal of numerous current structural inequities, widening access to qual-
ity education and other public services including rural infrastructure, breaking the current economic 
dominance by entrenched vested interests, as well as ensuring jobs and finance to those who are 
today left at the margins of the society, toward building a large middle class. Such an approach must 
be clearly distinguished from, and goes well beyond, the ongoing efforts in countries such as Brazil 
and Mexico that have been generally successful in reducing poverty and indigence (See also Box 3 on 
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the importance of the Middle Class). 
2. Higher Productivity                   
Clearly, Latin America must strive harder to achieve a much higher economic growth than it has 
managed in the past forty years (and even in the last five years), while reducing the historic depend-
ence of its economic fortunes on the ups and downs of international commodity prices. Certainly, the 
contribution of natural resources to the creation of wealth in the future must continue. Latin America 
would be ill-advised to turn its back on its natural endowment. However, as has been the case of other 
countries and regions with equivalent natural wealth, Latin America needs to broaden the base of its 
output and income, and better integrate its population to the benefits of economic growth. A more 
technology-intensive approach to these resources and a better integration within the region and with 
the world, supported by a more operationally educated and integrated labor force and a deepening of 
its capital base will be of the essence. Only in this way can the region break from its spotty and disap-
pointing economic growth path.
In this context, the link between investment, total factor productivity (TFP) and growth is particu-
larly important. Enhanced growth prospects need to be underpinned by higher TFP. Improvement in 
In some middle-income countries, the domestic market can complement export markets as the 
economy matures and the local market becomes large. In most countries, domestic consumption 
typically starts to grow quickly when incomes per capita reach around $6,000 in PPP terms. This did 
not happen in Latin America, perhaps because of the uneven distribution of income.
Compare Brazil with South Korea, for example. Brazil’s growth started to slow after 1980, when 
it had reached a per capita income level of $7,600 (PPP). At that time, its middle class, defined as 
households with incomes of between $10 and $100 per capita per 
day, was just 29 percent of the population. This made it virtually 
impossible for the middle-class to drive further growth. In contrast, 
South Korea’s income per capita reached $7,700 (PPP) in 1987. By 
that time, South Korea’s evenly distributed growth had produced 
a sizeable middle class, which accounted for 53 percent of the 
population. The country capitalized on the demand from this large 
middle class to grow its service industries and create the building 
blocks for a knowledge economy. Today 94 percent of Korea’s 
population is middle class.
Japan also benefited from a sizeable middle class when growing from a middle income country to 
a rich one. In 1965, Japan’s per capita income was $8,200 (PPP) and its middle class was 48 percent 
of the population. Japan was able to achieve per capita growth of 4.8 percent per year for the next 
twenty years.
Importance of the Middle Class in Fueling Growth
GDP Per Capita, 1979=09; 1994=100
Box
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TFP, in turn, is explained by the improvement in human capital and technological progress embodied 
in higher investment, supported by an environment and policies that promote higher investment. 
The strategic framework to change Latin American prospects and preserve its relative importance 
is thus dependent on two central and interrelated issues: the quality of economic policies and the likely 
needed increase in investment levels in a number of specific priority areas (discussed further below). 
Together, these two factors would allow for the increase in total factor productivity that is essential for 
Latin America to preserve its relative importance. To do so, other countries in the region will need to 
join Chile and the club of converging economies. 
In broad terms, investment in Latin America has hovered around 20 percent of GDP, more or less 
in line with the levels observed in the advanced economies and the Middle East, but far short of the 
level of around 35 percent observed in Developing Asia and the NICs (Figure 19). It should be noted 
that the current low levels of investment may reflect low returns from appreciated exchange rates and/
or high and distorted taxes and other legislative and administrative barriers. While exchange rates may 
not seem overvalued from a general equilibrium balance of payments point of view, the current equi-
librium may reflect existing inefficiencies, including a poor income distribution and exclusion. In fact, 
exchange rates may end up being more depreciated if distributional issues were not tackled in the cur-
rent form, namely, through high taxes on imports. Such protectionist domestic policies tend to lead to 
an appreciation of the currency, although offset in some cases by taxation on exports.                
In principle, a combination of adequate polices, and an associated level of investment of about 30 
percent of GDP would provide for sustained growth. This level of investment would in practice entail 
a doubling of net investment (i.e. net of depreciation and obsolescence). The magnitude of the effort 
is very large, and could not be accomplished without a large increase in the ability of the government 
to increase its investment, and in the commitment of the private sector to the national and regional 
economy. Of course, these would be directly dependent on increased savings, both in the private and 
public sectors.                             
Within the broad investment magnitudes, it is clear that public finances would have to be made 
available in order to mobilize additional resources. While fiscal positions in Latin America have tended 
to strengthen, and became less dependent on foreign and domestic borrowing, public capital expend-
iture has not followed an equivalent behavior. Current expenditures and social programs have been 
given greater priority. Thus, any new growth strategy will need to consider a rebalancing of the current/
capital expenditure mix. Moreover, the additional resources would have to be channeled in large part 
to infrastructure and other productivity-enhancing areas such as R&D, preferably with private support. 
In the same context, it will be imperative for Latin America to promote savings as an essential 
component of increased investment. Savings rates in the region of about 20 percent of GDP compare 
with rates of over 30 percent in the NICs and close to 50 percent in China (Figure 20). However, stud-
ies carried out by the IDB (Haussman, Talvi and Gavin) strongly suggest that savings are dependent 
on economic growth, more than the other way around, at least initially. To that extent, the low level of 
savings registered in the region may reflect not so much an impediment to growth but a reaction to low 44
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and volatile rates of growth13, as documented by Latin America’s record of numerous years of growth 
rates below 1 and 2 percent. In this sense, savings can be expected to pick up as conditions for 
growth improve over time. Of course, it will be necessary to address specific impediments to savings, 
in terms of the stability of the financial system, and a tax system and legal structure that creates incen-
tives for capital flight, beyond the corporate investment observed more recently, and for investment in 
low-yielding but value-preserving sectors.
3. Greater Competition and Openness  
The third pillar of the new strategy for the region should be promotion of much greater competi-
tion, both in internal markets and with external sources. Given the relatively smaller share of trade in 
total GDP, Latin American countries must give the highest priority to enhancing domestic compe-
tition, starting with the dismantling of monopolies—whether public or private—and enforcement of 
well-structured competition laws. In parallel, there is a need to promote and facilitate much greater 
openness to other countries in the region, closer links with fast-growing Asia that is emerging as the 
new center of gravity of the world economy, and the dismantling of remaining barriers to trade and 
investment with the global economy as a whole.
For many decades Latin America, like many other regions of the world, was characterized by an 
overwhelming presence of government in economic activity, well beyond a regulatory role. This was 
particularly the case in basic activities, such as: mining; metal and chemical production; agriculture; 
export activities; transportation; utilities; and telecommunications etc. The situation changed dramati-
cally starting in the 1970s in Chile, and in subsequent decades in many countries including Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Most importantly, during this period there was a major effort at 
13    National Accounts data may underestimate Latin America’s savings ratios, as the sizeable capital flight has been made possible through under-recording of 
exports and over-recording of imports.
Source:  IMF - World Economic Outlook, April 2010.
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privatizing many activities that were not considered as central to the role of the state or of strategic 
relevance; this was accompanied by significant efforts to improve the operations of many State owned 
enterprises to help them compete better in a world marked by increased competition, and increasingly 
demanding financial markets. There were many different methods pursued for the sale of government 
assets, some of them seriously flawed. In some circumstances, public monopolies were replaced by 
private monopolies.
Under these circumstances, improved domestic competition remains a work in progress in the 
region. It is true that given the size of many of the economies of the region it is not justified to have a 
myriad of enterprises within one country. However, this applies to very specific types of activities, for 
example, the presence of only one or few extractive industry companies in a small country. Frequently, 
the dominance in the market is accompanied by restrictions on imports of goods and services, or 
limitations to investment in specific areas, and thus helps consolidate the monopoly power of the 
companies. Regional integration and the consolidation of markets may increase competition, although 
at times this resulted in the extension of monopoly powers to particular companies across countries 
in the region.
While it is beyond the focus of this book to deal with the specific area of domestic competi-
tion, the consolidation of the competitiveness and productivity aspects of economic policy rest in 
significant part on the opening of markets. 
A further push in the process of privatiza-
tion, of improved regulations and opening 
of markets, as well as government sector 
productivity enhancement is important to 
help the region to attain a more effective 
growth path in the future.
In parallel with measures to enhance 
domestic  competition,  Latin  American 
economies must also pursue two ave-
nues to improve their trade performance 
in support of accelerated growth: regional 
cooperation leading to expanded intra-
regional  trade;  and  continued  diversifi-
cation  of  export  markets  beyond  North 
America and Europe, and of export products beyond the dominance of commodities and fuels (except 
in the case of Mexico).  
Latin America lags far behind Europe and Asia in regional cooperation, particularly as measured by 
intra-regional trade. There are three basic reasons for which the Latin America region should seriously 
consider significantly enhancing intra-regional trade, including through improved regional cooperation.   
First, it is important to permit the regional economies to specialize in the context of the larger 
regional market. The Growth Commission led by Nobel laureate Michael Spence found that a major 
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characteristic of the economies that have successfully avoided the middle income trap and made an 
effective transition to becoming high income economies was their ability to become specialized in 
economic activities. They managed to develop a competitive advantage in the global marketplace by 
proactively building unique skill sets and creating economies of scale. 
Second, enhanced intra-regional trade would help to overcome the reality that Latin America 
economies—with the exception of Brazil and Mexico—are small by global standards. Only Brazil and 
Mexico make the list of the world’s 15 largest economies or the 10 largest emerging economies.   
The other economies do not have domestic markets large enough to permit the economies of scale 
needed by firms to be globally competitive. 
Third, it would allow local firms to take advantage of their superior knowledge and understanding 
of the needs of customers in the neighboring countries compared to the competitors from other con-
tinents.  The economies—except in the Caribbean—are linked by a contiguous land mass, a common 
heritage and history, similar cultures and the same language (except for Brazil and the Caribbean). 
It should be natural for the consumers within the region to prefer similar (though not necessarily the 
same) products, and companies should have a competitive advantage in forging business relations 
with their regional counterparts and in marketing to the consumers in other parts of the region. 
Latin America must also gradually reduce its dependence on the slow-growing economies of 
North America and Europe and develop much closer ties with the world’s fastest growing region: Asia. 
The good news is that there has been a sharp increase in the region’s exports to Asia—albeit from a 
very small base; the share of China has risen from under 1 percent in 1990 to over 8 percent in 2009. 
With many models, including the model used in this study, predicting that Asia may account for as 
much as 50 percent of global GDP by 2050, increasing the region’s focus on Asia should be an integral 
part of Latin America’s long-term growth strategy. 
It is important to note that the increase in exports to Asia is based mainly on raw materials, includ-
ing fuels, agricultural commodities and metals—particularly the export of iron ore and copper to China.   
This is in line with the composition of the region’s exports, which is dominated by primary commodities 
and fuels which account for 56 percent of total exports (75 percent if Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela are 
excluded). The limited exports of manufactures (mostly from Mexico and Brazil) are concentrated in the 
low to medium technology end. The region stands to make significant gains by increasing the value-
added of its output and exports and, within manufacturing, to move up the technology ladder—also 
a critical measure for getting out of the middle income trap and making progress toward high income 
status. 
Finally, dismantling of remaining barriers to trade with and investment from the global markets as 
a whole will be a very powerful vehicle to curb the current monopolistic power of large companies, to 
increase competition at all levels, and to spur innovation. 
Specific Elements of the Convergence Strategy
To complement the broad contours of the three-pillar strategy described above, the region must invest 
in and focus on a number of specific priority areas in order to achieve the shared, more ambitious 47
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vision of convergence: 
•	 Promoting	equity	and	inclusion	
•	 Developing human capital
•	 Fostering	technology	development	and	innovation
•	 Upgrading	and	integrating	infrastructure
•	 Advancing regional cooperation and trade
•	 Improving	governance,	institutions,	and	implementation
These six issues are discussed below and are also further elaborated in detail in their appropri-
ate chapters in Part 2 of this book. They by no means constitute a comprehensive list, but they are 
the most critical issues/themes that require immediate attention by the region’s political leaders and 
policy makers. Significant strides in these areas are essential to ensure the much needed continuous 
improvements in total factor productivity that can underpin sustained growth.
Two other areas, not covered at any length in this book, also need to be addressed urgently:
•	 Environment,	including	the	deforestation	challenge	in	the	Amazon	region	and	the	generation	
of capital flows under the global cap-and-trade regime.
•	 Improved	security	and	quality	of	life,	particularly	in	urban	centers.
A. Promoting Equity and Inclusion
Latin America is one of the most unequal regions of the world and it has been like that for decades if 
not centuries. The concentration of income and wealth has been striking compared to other regions 
of the world (see Figure 7 above). With a Gini coefficient of 0.53, Latin America is 19 percent more 
unequal than Sub-Saharan Africa, 37 percent more unequal than East Asia and 65 percent more 
unequal than developed countries. Also, some countries with Gini coefficients close to 0.60, reach lev-
els of inequality among the highest in the world. Without an adequate correction of focus and policies, 
these problems will undermine the sustainability 
of the region’s growth. The persistence of pov-
erty and exclusion may well eliminate the great 
advantage of Latin America in terms of abun-
dant natural resources, water, and generally 
lower levels of environmental degradation than 
other regions of the world.
After periods of rising inequality first in the 
1980s and then in the 1990s, Latin America’s 
concentration of income began to fall starting 
in 2000 (Figure 21). Two main factors account 
for the decline in inequality: a fall in the earn-
ings  gap  of  skilled/low-skilled  workers  and, 
after years of considerable neglect, an increase 
in government pro-poor programs, including 
Source: Gasparini et al., 2009.
Note: Data are for most recent year within two years of dates listed. To 
make the changes in the Gini more visible, Figure 3’s y-axis begins at forty 
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targeted transfers to the poor. The fall in earnings gap, in turn, is mainly the result of the expansion of 
coverage in basic education during the last couple of decades, as discussed further below.  
The upgrading of skills of the poor, however, could soon face the “access-to-tertiary education” 
barrier—mainly due to the low quality education they receive in previous levels—and thus the decline 
in inequality may not continue when that barrier gets hit. In addition, despite the undeniable progress 
in making public policy more pro-poor, a large share of government spending is neutral or regressive 
in the distributive sense and the collection of personal income and wealth taxes is low. To continue 
on the path towards more equitable societies, making public spending more progressive and efforts 
to improve access to quality services—education, in particular—for the poor and the indigenous and 
afro-descendant populations are crucial.
While Latin America has more income inequality, the percentage of people below the extreme 
poverty line tends to be lower than for many of the larger Emerging Economies. (See Figure 22, which 
compares inequality and poverty in a number of Latin American and Asian countries.)
There is evidence that the region has been gradually moving in the “right” distributive direction. 
In particular, governments have been making a greater effort to correct for inequality in the distribu-
tion of opportunities, particularly as it refers to access to basic education. In addition, as mentioned 
above, governments have actively reduced poverty through direct transfers to the poor. However, a 
large share of public spending is still neutral or regressive from the distributive point of view and new 
measures can go in the direction of making it even more regressive. And taxes, in particular personal 
income taxes, are severely underutilized as a redistributive instrument in a region with a substantial 
number of ultra-high net worth (i.e. super rich) individuals. 
As discussed earlier, while educational enrollment has become undoubtedly and significantly more 
equal, the same cannot be said regarding the distribution of the quality of education. If the state wants 
to continue strengthening the path of equalizing opportunities through education as a way to equalize 
the distribution of income, addressing the inequality in quality levels of basic education and finding 
ways to compensate for the opportunity cost so the young poor can attend tertiary education must 
take priority in the public policy agenda.
The dynamics of inequality in Latin America respond to its political dynamics and the power exer-
cised by its elites. There is evidence that market liberalization might have replaced one group of preda-
tory elites by another group who is equally predatory and which uses their newly acquired power to 
retain privileges and monopoly rents. An understanding of the role played by elites in Latin America in 
limiting growth and perpetuating inequities will be a necessary step if state action is to correct them in 
its budgetary interventions and in how it affects institutions and norms.
The analysis of income inequality presented above is based on household surveys which do not 
capture the incomes of the truly wealthy. The production and access to more accurate information to 
estimate income concentration and the incidence of taxes and public spending is essential to enhanc-
ing transparency, accountability, fairness and efficiency of the state. 
Experience in other regions suggests alternatives which involve the development of institutions 
that assure genuine equity and provide incentives for innovation, investment in physical and human 49
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Note: The common internationally-used $1.25/ day per day, rather than the $2.50 generally used in Latin America, was chosen for this graph in order to provide a simple 
comparison with Asia but one must keep in mind that purchasing power is very different in the two regions. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2009, all data from 2004-2007 depending on availability. Averaged when data is available for more than one of 
those years.
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capital, and economic restructuring. Key areas for action include:
•	 Laying the institutional bases for competitive and effectively regulated markets, including in 
the area of labor.  
•	 Intensifying efforts to include segments of the population left out from the process of moderni-
zation—the indigenous groups and afro-descendants in particular. 
This chapter does not specifically cover spatial inequity which is tough to resolve, as illustrated 
by the lagging regions in the northeast of Brazil, or the mountain regions of the Andean countries. 
Continued decentralization with enhanced accountability to citizens, together with adequate monitor-
ing and quality control offers a promising route to address this challenge.  
B. Developing Human Capital 
1. Elementary and Secondary Education 
High quality education can make a significant contribution to a country’s development. It boosts earn-
ings and stimulates economic growth. It is a powerful tool for moving people out of poverty and 
improving the distribution of income. And it can foster democratic governance by creating an informed 
citizenry that can make good decisions. The region has made real progress in education. In virtually 
every country, governments have increased spending on education—building schools, adding teach-
ers, raising salaries, and enrolling more children (Figure 23). These efforts have clearly expanded the 
quantity of education (in terms of the number of children attending school), but spending per pupil is 
low (Figure 24), and there is little evidence that they have improved the quality of education (measured 
Total Public Education 
Expenditure as % GNP, 2007
Figure
23
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2009.
Public Spending per Student on 
Primary Education ($PPP), 2007 
Figure
24
Source: UNESCO, 2010, Table 11. p. 406; for El Salvador and Bolivia: 
UNESCO, 2009, Table 11. p. 366.
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by scores on achievement tests). If education is to play a major role in promoting growth, equity and 
democracy in Latin America, governments need to move beyond their historic emphasis on expanding 
enrollments, to an emphasis on expanding learning.
Enrollment is much higher than the average for the world. However, the coverage of education is 
far from universal, with one quarter of pre-school children not having access to schooling, with only 70 
percent of high school age students being enrolled, and with a high rate of attrition. And, unfortunately, 
Latin American schools—from pre-school to graduate school—provide low-quality education that fails 
to meet the needs of countries or students. Poor and minority students, mainly those enrolled in public 
K-12 schools, are particularly ill-served.
The  Latin  American  countries  that  participate  in  PISA  (Program  for  International  Student 
Assessment) all show performance that is below what would be predicted given their countries’ 
expenditure per student. A large share of the region’s scarce resource are “lost” to inefficiencies such 
as high repetition rates or poor teaching, and few countries are spending enough to provide poor 
children with the additional attention they need. Also, wide variations in spending among countries 
translate into differences in the quality and equity of education that children receive. Even relatively 
well-off Latin American students fail to excel by world standards. In five of six countries (Chile being 
the exception), the richest 20 percent of Latin American students failed to outperform the poorest 
20 percent of European OECD students in all three subjects (reading, math and science). While few 
studies track how many people speak English in any given country or their level of proficiency, existing 
evidence suggests that Latin American governments give English relatively low priority, and less prior-
ity than East Asian competitors.
Education is widely agreed to be one of the most powerful tools for reducing inequality. But gov-
ernment spending on education, despite significant growth, is making only limited headway in reduc-
ing inequality, and the region’s school systems do little to reduce inequality. Poor children in Latin 
America tend to begin school later, repeat more grades, drop out sooner, and score lower on tests 
than their better-off peers—regardless of their gender, race, ethnicity, or area of residence. Differences 
are often greater among disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups. Indigenous children are less likely 
to enroll in school, and they graduate later than their peers. These gaps widen at the secondary level. 
Similar disparities exist between Afro-descendant children and their white counterparts. 
Public spending on primary and secondary education is for the most part pro-poor or at least 
neutral, since most middle- and upper-class families send their children instead to private primary and 
secondary schools. But governments tend to overspend at the tertiary level so as to provide tuition-
free higher education for all. Public spending per higher education student in Latin America is often 
five (or more) times public spending per primary school student in Latin America, compared with ratios 
of approximately 1:1 in countries like Spain or Canada. Since the vast majority of students from poor 
families never reach the tertiary level, the result is a massive subsidy to the middle-class.
Latin America has, however, done a relatively good job of closing the gender gap in education. 
Girls are as likely, and in some countries more likely, to enroll in and complete their schooling as boys. 
Average scores from countries participating in international exams show girls doing better than boys 52
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in reading, boys doing better than girls in math, and only sometimes in science. The big exception is 
indigenous girls, who remain at a disadvantage in virtually every country. 
The chief obstacles to improving the region’s education systems are both technical and political, 
and reform strategies need to address both aspects, if they are to be effective. 
On the technical side, most ministries of education are weak—even incompetent—and so have 
limited capacity to manage a large and diverse education system. Teaching does not attract the best 
and brightest applicants—in part because training is inadequate, standards and prestige are low, 
incentives do not reward merit, and management is poor. 
On the political side, government leaders are reluctant to anger powerful interest groups that ben-
efit from the status quo—such as teachers’ unions or university students—and can mobilize protests 
or shut down schools. The clients of public schools—mostly poor families—have almost no power 
in the school system. They have little information on how schools are doing, few mechanisms for 
influencing education policy or practice, and no tradition of citizen activism. Those parents with real 
power to influence schools, primarily middle- and upper-class, send their children to private schools. 
Consequently, they do not bring significant pressure to bear on governments (or on teachers unions) 
for improvement. The result is a system that serves the interests of teachers relatively well (providing 
great job security regardless of performance) but neglects the interests of parents and students (pro-
viding them with third-rate education in under-funded and poorly-managed public schools).
To redress this political imbalance, governments need to strengthen their position vis-à-vis at least 
some of the interest groups that have “captured” the public education system. It is important to design 
a carefully conceived strategy that pushes for change in a way that takes account of the political 
economy of addressing interests—teachers unions and university students, for example—that appear 
to stand in the way. A dual-prong strategy seems advisable. On the one hand, they need to reduce the 
inordinate power that interest groups, particularly teachers unions, wield. Doing so will be politically 
difficult. On the other, they need to develop a stronger, more effective demand for quality education—
by parents and employers—that can provide political support for reform efforts. 
Governments should make learning the central objective of their education systems, and stress 
policies that promote learning. They should consider the following policies:
(i)  Provide all children with quality pre-school education and invest in high-quality basic educa-
tion, ensuring that the poor, indigenous people, and afro-descendants are properly served.
(ii)  Establish  world-class  learning  standards  in  reading,  math  and  science  for  all  grades. 
Standards should be clear, measurable and high. Teacher training, textbooks, and student 
assessments should be keyed to them.
(iii)  Develop robust and transparent evaluation systems that regularly assess the learning of all 
children in reading, math and science. Results should be used to inform teachers, parents, 
politicians and opinion leaders and to improve schools.
(iv)  Recruit top graduates into teaching by setting high standards, making entry much more 
selective, and training intensively in classroom instruction.
(v)  Restructure teacher management, strengthening the power to hire and fire, keying pay to 53
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performance, assessing effectiveness and providing in-class support. Work intensively with 
teachers to make sure they become effective instructors, granting tenure only to the best and 
removing poor performers from the classroom.
(vi)  Make proficiency in English a fundamental goal of the education system. Governments should 
make a strong effort to provide the poor with basic writing and speaking skills in English, 
beginning in primary school.
2. Tertiary Education 
While educational issues are critical at the elementary and secondary school levels, tertiary educa-
tion is also showing strains. Latin America has high levels of Tertiary Education participation, and 
enrollment levels have improved markedly over the last ten years but are still half the average for 
high-income countries and well below rates in more successful economies, like the United States and 
Korea. Moreover, most Latin American university students do not complete their studies. Forty percent 
of Argentine university students drop out in the first year, and only a quarter of those admitted go on 
to graduate. Only a third of those admitted in Chile and half of those admitted in Colombia graduate. 
The situation is similar in Mexico, where only 30 percent of those that enter in any given year graduate. 
This has serious implications for education finance. Taxpayers are supporting a small cadre of (largely 
middle-class) college students who seldom complete their degrees, with funds that might help large 
numbers of poor students who are failing to complete secondary school.
The issues of quality and fields of study at the tertiary level also merit attention. Hard data on 
quality is scarce at this level. Two of the region’s largest public universities, the National Autonomous 
University (UNAM) in Mexico and the University of Buenos Aires in Argentina, have traditionally refused 
to seek national accreditation or submit to external evaluation. Brazil is an interesting exception, having 
evaluated university graduates, under various systems, since 1995.
The limited evidence that exists suggests that the region’s universities are not globally competitive. 
In a 2008 ranking of the world’s 200 top universities, no Latin American University ranked in the top 
100, and only three (National Autonomous University of Mexico, University of Sao Paulo and University 
of Buenos Aires) were included—at ranks 150, 196 and 197. In a similar 2008 ranking of the world’s 
top 500 universities conducted by the Shanghai Jiao Tong University, no Latin American university 
ranked in the top 100, and only three (University of Sao Paulo in Brazil, Universidad de Buenos Aires 
and Universidad Nacional Autónoma in Mexico) ranked in the top 200. In total, only 10 Latin American 
universities made the top 500 (six of them from Brazil). By comparison: South Korea had eight univer-
sities in the top 500; China (excluding Hong Kong and Taiwan), eighteen; Taiwan, seven; Hong Kong, 
five; South Africa, three; and India, two.
With respect to fields of study, the region’s universities produce very few science or engineering 
graduates. The bulk of university graduates are in social science, law, or business. In most coun-
tries, less than a quarter receive science or engineering degrees. By contrast, nearly 40 percent of all 
Korean university graduates, and nearly 30 percent of all Irish and Finnish graduates are trained in sci-
ence or engineering. In Latin America, only Mexico has similar rates (Figure 25). Not surprisingly, when 54
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business executives in 117 countries were asked 
to rank the availability of scientists and engi-
neers in their country, no Latin American coun-
try scored in the top 50, and only five scored 
above the mean (Argentina, Costa Rica, Chile 
and Venezuela).
The  modification  of  these  disappointing 
patterns will require considerable action with a 
major shift in the roles of government and the 
private sector, including foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI). The government should be a facili-
tator, balancing international knowledge and 
financial resources, to deal with social returns 
which are highest. While reform efforts will need 
to be pushed vigorously in the area of educa-
tion, Latin America finds itself in a privileged 
position in terms of resources. With education 
expenditure being relatively high as a proportion of GDP, and growth in population declining, the 
public sector will be able to reorient expenditure in order to improve education, at least at the elemen-
tary and secondary levels. Tertiary education (and related research) may require additional resources. 
Governments should focus their efforts on the following:
1.  Conditioning funding for universities on meeting specific performance objectives. Emphasis 
should be placed on improving quality, strengthening science and technology, and promoting 
equity. Rather than channeling all public funds directly to universities, governments should 
experiment with providing some part of funding directly to students (principally from poor 
families).
2.  Requiring public universities to charge tuition to those who can afford to pay. Charges should 
be on a sliding scale, depending principally on socioeconomic background. 
However, in order to convert Latin America into a source of technological excellence, actions will 
be required to combine the efforts of private and public education, as well as corporate support and 
direct involvement. 
C. Fostering Technology Development and Innovation
Innovation today is widely recognized as a major source of competitiveness and economic growth for 
all countries—advanced and emerging economies alike. Innovation has a critical role in creating jobs, 
generating incomes and in improving living standards of a society. Innovation can also be a power-
ful tool in broader social development including in moving people out of poverty and improving the 
distribution of income. “Inclusive innovation” targeted at the population at the bottom of the pyramid is 
gaining importance as a means of making the benefits of innovation available to all citizens. Over the 
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long term, the main drivers of global economic growth include technological advance in rich countries 
and catch-up technology adoption in a group of fast-growing convergers (such as Chile, Republic of 
Korea, China and India), which are shifting resources from low to higher productivity activities. Almost 
half of the difference in growth performance between Mexico and the Republic of Korea over 40 years 
is attributable to technology-related improvement (TFP); more rapid gains in TFP growth can unleash 
a major source of economic growth.
TFP and, particularly, TFP growth in Latin America are low compared with many parts of the 
world and of course the United States and Europe. According to the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report (2008-2009), the only country in the region which features among the most 
competitive economies in the world is Chile (ranked 28th in the Global Competitiveness Index- GCI). 
As shown in Table 4, in the Knowledge Economy, Innovation, and ICT Index, Latin America is 
lagging behind regions like East Asia and Pacific, and Europe and Central Asia. Furthermore, Latin 
America’s scores are lower than the average of all countries. 
Consistent with these indicators, and as discussed earlier, the region produces a limited number 
of scientists and advanced degree recipients, which constrains the region’s technological develop-
ment. While it entails too strict a standard of comparison, OECD countries produce one new PhD 
per 5,000 people, while in Brazil the ratio is 1 per 70,000; in Chile, 1 per 140,000; and in Colombia 
1 per 700,000. Brazil produces around 7,000 PhDs per year and scores the highest in domestically 
formed PhDs in the region, even when adjusted by population, (accounting for more than 70 percent of 
total Latin American PhDs according to RICYT’s estimates). Without more qualified advanced degree 
recipients, the ability of countries to use and generate knowledge, adapt and use technology is limited. 
KEI Innovation ICT
Country 2009 1995 2009 1995 2009 1995
Latin America 5.21 5.51 5.8 6.12 5.27 6.32
High Income 8.23 8.35 9.02 9.14 8.42 8.62
Europe and 
Central Asia 6.45 6.25 6.99 6.9 6.46 7.02
East Asia and 
the Pacific 6.41 6.96 8.49 8.9 6.64 7.76
All Regions 5.95 6.35 8.11 8.2 6.22 7.52
Middle East and 
North Africa 5.47 5.84 7.57 7.49 5.71 7
Africa 2.71 3.37 4.31 4.57 2.45 4.89
South Asia 2.58 3.06 3.29 3.04 2.45 4.28
Source: World Bank , KEI and KI Indexes, KAM 2009.
Knowledge Economy Index in World Regions
Table
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Latin America’s scientific output is also low compared to other regions, both in terms of scientific and 
engineering articles and patents granted.
Latin America has performed poorly in terms of its National Innovation System (NIS) consisting 
of the institutions, laws, regulations and procedures that affect how knowledge is acquired, created, 
disseminated and applied in the economy. Governments from time to time have been taking steps 
for promoting science, technology and innovation (STI). But most countries lack a coherent policy 
and related tools to implement such a policy and the actual results on the ground remain well below 
desired levels. Although there are exceptions, generally, the public sector dominates in most aspects 
of STI activities, R&D institutions are not up-to-date, innovation support institutions are mostly inef-
fective, use of technology and innovation by industry is low, and the workforce lacks requisite skills to 
generate and use technology. Also, the STI policies in the region have not paid enough attention to the 
structural transformation of the public R&D Institutions. The collaboration between innovation actors is 
either non-existent or weak. 
In the global context, Latin America is still a marginal player in R&D, accounting for less than 2 
percent of world R&D expenditure, well below its share of some 7 percent in world GDP, and this gap 
is persistent. The average R&D intensity in the region was 0.6 percent of GDP in 2006 as opposed 
to 2.7 percent in the USA, 3.0 percent in Japan, and 2.3 percent in OECD. Brazil, Mexico, Chile and 
Argentina account for almost 90 percent of total expenditure in the region. The Republic of Korea by 
itself spends 50 percent more on R&D than the entire Latin America region. Moreover, there is no clear 
trend as to the distribution of expenditure between the private and public sectors, and the private 
sector has a much lower participation than in advanced economies. Today, in most nations of the 
region, knowledge created in the R&D laboratories tends to stay in the lab, rather than being converted 
into licenses, patents, products, processes and services. There are problems at both the supply and 
demand side. On the supply side, universities and public R&D institutions which account for almost 
70 percent of R&D have not created mechanisms to identify market/user needs; instead they focus 
mostly on the publishable mainstream science. There has not been much demand for local R&D from 
the industry. Government initiatives to address this imbalance have not been successful either.
The region needs to develop an integrated STI system that is driven by excellence to improve its 
place in the global technology ladder, as several East Asian countries (such as Japan and Korea) have 
done over the past half century, and as Chile, Brazil and Mexico within the region, as well as China 
and India are doing today. The region needs a technology and innovation system that is driven by the 
private sector, highly productive, globally competitive, and capable of meeting the needs of its globaliz-
ing economy. This will require an increase in R&D investments from 0.6 percent to almost 2 percent 
of GDP in the long run—to be invested by both the public sector and the private sector—pursuing 
frontier, strategic and inclusive innovation, enhancing marketable R&D, and creating a foundation to 
diffuse and encourage the absorption of existing and newly-created technologies. Countries in the 
region need to be pragmatic while designing STI policies and programs; they must give high priority to 
cooperation and collaboration with their regional neighbors.
To translate a technology and innovation agenda into concrete actions, Latin America will require 57
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a major shift in the roles of the government and the private sector. Governments should normally be a 
facilitator with intelligent regulations, proper oversight, financing, enhancing private sector participation 
with proper policies, tax and other incentives. They should focus on public goods where social returns 
are highest. A large presence of the domestic private sector and FDI will ensure expansion, higher 
quality output and relevance where public sector initiatives have been inefficient, insufficient and unre-
liable. The region has much to learn from Argentina, Chile, Brazil and Mexico in the region; as well as 
China, India, and South Korea; and from the US, with an STI system that excels globally.  
STI strategies specific to individual countries will need to be based on the scientific and technologi-
cal level of the country and the technological needs of its economy and business climate. 
The key recommendations that are common across the region in the area of technology and inno-
vation are:
(i)  Repositioned Public Sector. Redirect the role of the Public Sector to focus on production of 
public goods, and facilitate innovation by the private sector, through legislation, finance and 
other incentives. 
(ii)  Regional Cooperation. Enhance cooperation and collaboration in and outside the region to 
benefit from existing STI facilities in countries with better systems. This will help achieve eas-
ier, faster results and benefits at a lower cost.
(iii)  Inclusive Innovation. Pursue frontier as well as “inclusive innovation” with the dual purposes 
of global competitiveness and inclusive growth to benefit all people. Encouraging R&D 
Institutions and universities to focus on the needs of poor people and improving the ability of 
informal firms to absorb knowledge, can lower costs and create income-earning opportunities 
for poor people. 
(iv)  Innovation Infrastructure. Upgrade basic innovation infrastructure such as metrology stand-
ards, testing and quality (MSTQ) system, intellectual property rights (IPR), training, and skills 
upgrading, to enhance innovation and technology commercialization and diffusion, and to 
contribute to enterprise competitiveness.
(v)  Public Support for R&D and Technology Absorption. Provide public finance for basic research, 
applied research, technology diffusion, and skills upgrading, thus increasing productivity by 
diffusing knowledge produced at the local and regional academic and R&D institutions, and 
knowledge available globally.
(vi)  Centers of Excellence. Create “Centers of Excellence” in certain countries (with regional man-
dates as much as possible). This could include increased efforts in producing more eco-
nomically relevant public goods, such as pre-competitive research, and socially-relevant inno-
vations, such as access to clean water, urban congestion, urban transport, clean energy 
technologies, renewable energy, public health, and technologies for sustainable livelihoods. 
D. Upgrading and Integrating Infrastructure14 
14    Based upon findings in Scandizzo, Stefania and Pablo Sanguinetti, 200958
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Empirical evidence has shown that the level of infrastructure is a key determinant of long-term eco-
nomic growth in Latin America, as elsewhere, and that an increase in the stock of infrastructure would 
have significant effects on the region’s growth rate. Improving the stock of infrastructure, both in terms 
of quantity and of quality, is a priority for Latin American countries. Important infrastructure bottle-
necks are increasingly apparent, creating obstacles to trade and economic growth. Problems associ-
ated with congestion and poorly maintained infrastructure threaten the region’s competitiveness and 
have contributed to constraining Latin America’s participation in world trade and FDI. The quality of life 
is also affected directly by improvements in the provision of basic services and infrastructure. 
With respect to access to basic infrastructure services, Latin America has made important 
advances, but such advances have been slow and uneven across countries and income groups. In 
the case of sanitation, for example, Bolivia is well below the regional average, with only 46 percent of 
the population with access to improved sanitation (Table 5).
Most countries in the region rank consistently in the bottom half of the ranking with respect to 
overall infrastructure quality, with the average Latin American country ranking well below East Asia, as 
shown earlier in Figure 12.
Latin America’s poor infrastructure is even more evident if one considers individual sectors, as 
the region consistently scores behind all regions except South Saharan Africa (SSA). Moreover, in the 
case of railroads, Latin America scores even worse than SSA. Only in the case of electricity does Latin 
America score comparably to Asia (Figure 26). 
Latin America’s long-term infrastructure requirements thus remain substantial despite the recent 
global economic slowdown. Based on the model used in this study and assuming business as usual, 
















(% of households 
with access to 
electricity)
Region 1990 2006 1990 2006 1990 2008 1990 2008
Latin America  67.9 78.3 83.9 91.4 6.0 98.8 70.0 92.7
Europe & 
Central Asia 88.3 88.7 90.3 95.0 12.3 135.5 100.0
Middle East & 
North Africa 66.7 74.5 88.8 87.7 3.3 74.3 61.0 93.6
East Asia & 
Pacific 48.1 65.6 68.3 87.4 0.8 174.6 56.0 90.3
Source: Intenational Emergy Agency (IEA) 2007.
Access to Infrastructure Services, by Region
Table
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Source: World Economic Forum 2009, Global Competitiveness Report.
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during the next thirty years (2011–2040). This comprises about $5.1 trillion for new capacity and about 
$2.7 trillion for maintenance (Figure 27). Under the revival/convergence scenario, these needs would 
rise dramatically, by over two-thirds, to over $13 trillion, with about $9.6 trillion for new capacity and 
$3.4 trillion for maintenance. In fact, by 2040, the convergent scenario’s yearly investment needs 
would be over double those of the business as usual case.
Although the aggregate requirements are staggering, as a percentage of GDP, these needs are 
significantly lower than for other countries, particularly in Asia. Latin America must invest 4 percent of 
GDP into infrastructure in the next 30 years for the convergent case. Although, for the most part, these 
requirements may mandate a doubling of current levels, they are lower than the over 6 percent of GDP 
demands of Asia’s infrastructure over the next decade. 
Sectorally, power requires the largest share (about 72 percent of total requirements in the conver-
gent case); roads are a distant second (about 11 percent); and the third-largest needs exist in ports 
(about 9 percent), almost all (87 percent of the costs) for new capacity.
An examination of the state of infrastructure in Latin America underlines not only the need for 
greater investment, but the importance of improved management. The magnitude of the infrastructure 
investment requirements suggests that a strong public-private partnership should be developed, both 
for financing and on efficiency grounds. Moreover, these efforts need to have a strong regional per-
spective, with the help of international and regional institutions. 
An institutional framework based on a combination of appropriate incentives for private participa-
tion, independent and effective regulation, and proper planning and coordination are thus essential. 
Chile, Peru and Mexico are far advanced in these areas and provide good examples for the region 
to follow. Governments in the region face the challenge of increasing infrastructure financing, and 
creating the necessary conditions to promote and retain quality investment in the sector. In particular, 
governments play a fundamental role in providing good institutions, and must dedicate themselves to 
establishing the necessary juridical and regulatory framework to promote credibility and security in the 
sector.
In the near term, the main focus of policy should be to:
•	 Further increase investment levels to overcome current bottlenecks. The region needs to 
invest an average of about 4 percent of GDP (including maintenance and rehabilitation) to 
support economic growth of 6-7 percent a year;
•	 Adopt programs to eliminate electricity and other shortages and accelerate completion of 
rural electrification and national highways programs;
•	 Strengthen institutional capacity, including to implement existing policies;
•	 Simplify and delegate government decision-making;
•	 Monitor results and enforce accountability.
The longer term effort should be driven by the following reforms:
•	 Increase the role of the private sector;
•	 Make markets more competitive—with stronger and independent regulatory bodies;
•	 Plan and design infrastructure with a long-term (30 to 50 year) perspective.61
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E. Advancing Regional Cooperation and Trade
Over the last thirty years, trade and capital flows to and from emerging market economies have 
increased at a very rapid pace. Without question, their economic and trade growth have constituted 
the most dynamic aspect of international cooperation and globalization in recent years. In the same 
period, Latin America made considerable progress in liberalizing and integrating into the world econ-
omy, possibly the most noticeable structural advance achieved in the last two decades. The impact 
of liberalization has been significant—albeit with a lag—and Latin America’s increasing openness to 
world trade has resulted in considerable gains relative to its situation 25-30 years ago. The ratio of 
trade to GDP in actual prices increased dramatically between 1984-2009 from around 18 percent 
to 47 percent. However, even as Latin America 
has opened up considerably, it remains behind 
world and OECD averages (64 percent and 52 
percent respectively). Its population-adjusted 
ratio of trade to GDP of under 60 percent com-
pares with close to 160 percent for the NICs, 
over 100 percent for China and developing Asia 
and around 80 percent for India.
The story of Latin American exports is simi-
lar.  Latin  America’s  exports  have  grown  but 
those of the NICs have grown more rapidly. 
While Latin America has maintained its share 
of world exports of 5-6 percent, the NICs have 
more than doubled their share, and developing 
Asia has more than tripled it, from under 5 per-
cent to over 16 percent (Table 6).
1.  Intra-Regional  Trade  and  Regional 
Cooperation
Trade  integration  has  been  a  major 
objective  among  different  emerging 
regions.  Moreover,  these  efforts  were 
further enhanced by the stellar progress 
of the EU over the last half a century. 
Asia has been able to integrate effec-
tively  without  a  complex  institutional 
framework equivalent to that of the EU. 
Rather,  the  process  has  occurred  in 
response to the liberalization efforts of 







Region (1980-2009) 1980 2009
Developing 
Asia 10.1 4.7 16.3
NICs 9.8 3.1 7.5
Latin America 6.0 5.6 5.8
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade database, 2010.
Growth in World Exports
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China and India. However, this has not been the case in Latin America, notwithstanding official efforts 
that have extended for well over a century.
Trade flows reflect the process of regional cooperation and integration within each developing area 
and with other emerging economies. All areas, with the exception of Latin America, have shown a sig-
nificant increase in intra-regional trade. The degree of regional integration in Asia is particularly impres-
sive at every level, explaining two thirds of total trade for the region, and about half for the emerging 
economies including China.  
In the Americas, the degree of regional trade including the North American countries has increased, 
but after reaching 40 percent, it declined and remains at about one third of total trade. However, after 
some years of growth, intra-Latin American trade, at some 20 percent of the total, is at about the same 
level as in 1980. This suggests that there has been only limited success in developing a process of 
integration in new activities in spite of the major efforts to establish trade agreements within the region, 
including trade blocks like Mercosur, the Andean Group, and the Central American Common Market, 
which have sought to provide the opportunity to integrate these economies (Table 7).  
There are three basic reasons for which the Latin America region should seriously consider signifi-
cantly enhancing intra-regional trade, including through improved regional cooperation: 
a) Need for Economies to Specialize
The Growth Commission led by Nobel laureate Michael Spence found that a major characteristic of the 
economies that have successfully avoided the middle income trap and made an effective transition to 
becoming high income economies was their ability to become specialized in economic activities. Such 
specialization involves investments in activities with greater value-added by shifting resources—labor 
and capital—from labor intensive activities whose viability is dependent on low wages (and hence 
lower per capita income) into economic activities that have higher innovation and technology content, 
allowing greater returns to both capital and labor; the resulting higher wage levels in turn raise people’s 
living standards and boost the country’s per capital income.  
A closer look at higher income countries (developed and NICs) reveals that, except for a few large 
Region 1980 2009
European Union 61.6 67.2
Developing Asia with 
Advanced Asia 55.8 74.8
Developing Asia 24.1 47.3
Latin America 21.0 21.2
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade database, 2010.
Percentage of Exports within Region 
Table
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economies, most high wage economies have achieved at least some degree of specialization in the 
global marketplace. Given our earlier conclusion that many—though by no means all—Latin American 
economies have been mired in the middle income trap, it appears logical that an important step in 
Latin American countries’ ability to escape this trap would be their success in moving towards such 
specialization on a global scale so as to raise their productivity. To successfully achieve such speciali-
zation, firms need ready access to markets that are large enough to yield economies of scale at the 
national or regional level before they can compete in the global marketplace. Unfortunately, doing so at 
the national level is not possible In Latin America except in Brazil and Mexico. 
b) Small Size of Most Latin Economies
Only two Latin American countries rank amongst the top 15 economies in the world: Brazil at number 
9 and Mexico at number 11 in PPP terms, and at number 8 and 14, respectively, in terms of market 
exchange rates. In 2009, again only Brazil and Mexico made the list of the top 10 emerging markets 
economies (Table 8). All CAF member countries combined were equivalent to only 60 percent of the 
GDP of China alone. Only two economies—Brazil and Mexico—had more than 1 percent of global 
GDP. And, in PPP terms their combined GDP was slightly less than that of India and less than half of 
China.
So what is the basic conclusion from this information? While most Latin American economies 
belong to the upper middle-income group, they are relatively small in absolute size—with the excep-
tion of Brazil and Mexico. Therefore, local firms operating exclusively in their home country markets 
would find it extremely difficult to achieve economies of scale and thus face a significant challenge in 
2000 GDP (billion US$) 2009 GDP (billion US$)
China 1,198 China 4,909
Brazil 644 Brazil 1,574
Mexico 329 India 1,236
Korea 533 Russia 1,229
India 462 Mexico 875
Taiwan 326 Korea 833
Argentina 284 Turkey 615
Turkey 266 Indonesia 539
Russia 260 Poland 430
Saudi Arabia 189 Taiwan 379
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2009, all data from 2004-2007 depending on availability. 
Top 10 Emerging Markets by GDP 
Table
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becoming globally competitive and creating high paying jobs. Closer regional cooperation in the hemi-
sphere that facilitates much greater regional trade and investment flows that significantly expand the 
“home” markets can go a long way in helping the region aspire to create global players.
c) Unexploited Potential within the Region
The low trade between the Latin American economies (at 21 percent in 2009) is partly due to the past 
focus of both the region’s governments and private business on the US and European markets. But, it 
also appears to be a natural outcome of the government policies that over the years have created bar-
riers against trade and investment flows to neighboring countries. In addition, physical transport and 
logistics facilities between neighboring countries have also been a constraint.    
It is critical that regional economies begin to tap the significant unexploited potential for greater 
trade and investment flows within the region by removing current barriers. The resulting increase 
in intra-regional trade and investment flows—combined with greater focus on Asia (discussed 
below)—would not only create newer, faster growing market opportunities but also help diversify the 
region’s export markets and thus further reduce the current heavy reliance on exports to the US and 
Europe. While this process appears to be already underway, its pace can and should be significantly 
accelerated.  
2. Trade Diversification     
a) Diversifying Markets
Latin America’s trade has predominantly been with the US, the region’s traditional and largest trading 
partner, and Europe. This has begun to change, particularly over the past decade. Over the past 10 
years, the sharpest growth of trade in the last decade is with China (26 percent per annum) and India 
(22 percent), and the slowest growth, with the US (2.2 percent) (Table 9). China’s share has risen from 
under 1 percent in 1990 to 8.2 percent in 2009.  It is worth noting that last year, China became Brazil’s 
largest trading partner, surpassing the United States.
This sharp rise in the region’s trade with developing Asia overall—and with China and India in 
particular—has a number of advantages: it is helping the region to diversify its trade; it is strengthen-
ing economic ties with the fastest growing region of the world; it reduces the region’s dependence on 
the mature and slower growing markets in North America and Europe; and, through higher growth of 
exports, it helps boost the overall economic growth of Latin America.   
Continuing to increase its focus on Asia should be an integral part of Latin America’s long-term 
growth strategy. 
b) Diversifying into Higher Value-Added Products
The composition of Latin American exports has been considerably less dynamic than the destination 
of exports; they continue to be dominated by primary commodities and fuels. The region’s manufac-
turing exports are mostly concentrated at the low technology end. The proportion of high technology 65
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goods within manufacturing exports for the region as a whole is under 8 percent compared to 30 
percent for China and 25 percent for the NICs.  With Mexico and Brazil excluded, the proportion falls 
below that of India (5 percent).
Latin America stands to make significant gains by increasing the value-added of its output and 
exports and, within manufacturing, to move up the technology ladder—a critical measure for getting 
out of the middle income trap and making progress toward high income status. 
F. Improved Governance, Institutions and Implementation 
A closer look at each and every crucial issue facing the region reveals that the underlying problems in 
each are rooted in poor governance, and that without fundamental improvements in governance it will 
not be possible to tackle these issues effectively.
Most political scientists equate good governance with democratic governments. In our view, while 
a democratic political system is indeed highly desirable and Latin America has made marked progress 
in that direction, governance comprises of many facets that go well beyond the political system. The 
various facets of governance are intertwined with each other like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle.
As shown by a variety of reliable public opinion surveys—Latin American Barometer, Americas 










Eastern Europe 13.9 0.8
Africa 13.9 1.9
Rest of World 10.5 10.5
Canada 9.9 2.4
Latin America 9.3 22
Japan 7.8 3.5
Developing Asia
(w/o China, India) 7.1 1.7
European Union 7.1 13.3
United States 2.4 34.8
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade database, 2010.
Latin America Export Destinations Table
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system (Table 10 and Figure 28). While there are some important reversals in the support for democ-
racy in countries such as Colombia and Mexico, that is the model preferred by most respondents 
in the region. That good news is countered, however, by widespread dissatisfaction with govern-
ment services, including the provision of security, justice, education, and basic infrastructure. Some 
of these issues are illustrated in Table 11, based on the 2009 Survey of the Latin American Barometer. 
Confidence in key public institutions such as political parties and justice systems is disturbingly low in a 
number of countries, even some with sound economic performance. For sustainable prosperity, levels 
of trust need to increase, which democratic governments and effective leaders can best accomplish 
by delivering sound services. Looking ahead, that is the primary political challenge. The pressures of 
globalization mean that, increasingly, pragmatism must trump ideology in policy-making throughout 
Latin America. That trend has significant implications for the region’s long-term political landscape. 
Democracy is preferable to any type of government
% of surveyed respondents who agree:
Country 1996 2001 2008 2009 Change since 
2008
El Salvador 56 25 50 68 18
Honduras 42 57 44 55 11
Brazil 50 30 47 55 8
Chile 54 45 51 59 8
Guatemala 50 33 34 42 8
Panama 75 34 56 64 8
Costa Rica 80 71 67 74 7
Peru 63 62 45 52 7
Argentina 71 58 60 64 4
Bolivia 64 54 68 71 3
Uruguay 80 79 79 82 3
Venezuela 62 57 82 84 2
Mexico 53 46 43 42 -1
Nicaragua 59 43 58 55 -3
Dominican Rep. na na 73 67 -6
Paraguay 59 35 53 46 -7
Colombia 60 36 62 49 -13
Ecuador 52 40 56 43 -13
Source: The Economist based on Latino-barómetro 2009.
Democracy Gets the Upper Hand in Most Countries
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For Latin America to pursue a path towards significantly greater prosperity in coming years, it will 
be crucial to build more effective democratic governance throughout the region. Such a political devel-
opment is not only consistent with, but essential for, the social and economic policies outlined in this 
book. It will be important to forge a political system based on consultation, dialogue and consensus-
building. That formula has proved effective in the case of Chile, and appears to be taking hold and 
producing positive results in Brazil as well. 
Such politics needs to be accompanied by an effective political party system characterized by 
competition. This is the best way to keep political leaders fully accountable, and to yield decisions that 
respond most effectively to citizens’ demands. Alternative models can produce short-term benefits but 
are rarely sustainable. As globalization intensifies, the governance structures marked by an open party 
system will best correspond to the region’s challenges and needs. 
Over the coming decades, expectations are likely to continue to rise among groups that are newly 
incorporated into Latin America’s politics. Sustainable prosperity will be difficult to achieve without 
being inclusive, reaching out and consulting with such key populations as indigenous and afro-
descendant groups. The importance of such a political approach can be seen in the case of Peru, 
both in the conflicts surrounding the privatizations that took place in 2001 and the ongoing violence 
Source:  Latino-barómetro 2009.
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I. Main Problems for Latin
American Countries
Unemployment  21%




Inflation, Violence, Corruption, 
Health, Education
3% each











III. Guarantees under Democratic Regime
Religion 79%
Gender Equality/Freedom of 
expression/ Professional Development
57-67%
Private Property/ Equality of 
Opportunity/ Environment
44-47%






Protection against Crime   25%
Source: Latino-barómetro 2009.
Key Issues at National Level
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over natural resources—oil and gas—in the Amazon region. Coherent and responsive party systems, 
and sound political leadership, are best equipped to anticipate such problems and defuse tensions 
before they become destabilizing and put ambitious and worthy economic goals at risk. 
Another key dimension of effective democratic governance in Latin America involves striking the 
right balance between national authority and local control. Decentralization is well underway through-
out the region. There have been considerable advances. But it is also important to ensure a greater 
measure of financial autonomy in Latin American cities, while at the same time guarding against anti-
democratic practices at the local level. There is no single recipe that applies in all Latin American 
countries, but decentralization combined with accountability to the local population is a critical area for 
policy experimentation and reform. 
Civil service reform should be of the highest priority to contribute to more effective implementa-
tion and necessary continuity of long-term policies that can help produce sustained prosperity in 
Latin America. The Chilean experience particularly shows the importance of having a low turnover of 
key administration officials such as finance ministers. The high turnover in many countries is a major 
obstacle to economic progress. This is essentially a political challenge that will involve incentives and 
rewards for long-term public service and measures to discourage key appointments being made for 
short-term political advantage. 
In the end, the outcome of any long-term formulation of policies will depend not only on the politi-
cal environment but also on the ability to implement policies. In addition to the lack of a shared vision, 
a major difference between Latin America and the successful growth cases of the past has been the 
lack of adequate implementing structures (formal and informal). The region will have to undergo a 
transformation to: create a more competent and motivated civil service, geared to the challenges of 
the next quarter century; engage in a non-adversarial approach to public-private relations, in a coop-
erative environment; improve the competitive environment of the region; inculcate a stronger code of 
ethics for the civil service and the private sector, particularly in regards to the conduct of business 
with the government; ensure effective formulation of priorities and monitoring of results; and promote 
accountability with a clear system of rewards and punishment for the political system of government. 
Of equivalent importance, there is a need for a transformation of the institutional set-up. While Latin 
America tends to have a sophisticated and generally comprehensive legislative structure, it has a judi-
ciary that does not operate effectively, and is subject to considerable political pressure. Accordingly, 
the implementation of existing rules and regulations fall short of the requirements of a modern society. 
The prevalence of form over substance in the judicial process makes it even more complicated than 
would be expected under the current circumstances.  Aside from the serious flaws in many judicial 
systems, and the urgent need for reform, there is an equally compelling case to be made for major 
governmental action on police reform. This has been a relatively neglected area of public policy, but 
the gap between the gravity of the problem (which, experts claim, shows no sign of abating in com-
ing years) and the capacity of police forces to respond adequately, is growing. Rampant crime and 
insecurity will continue to limit growth and prosperity in a number of Latin American countries, includ-
ing Brazil and Mexico. Corruption and lack of professionalism besets police forces throughout the 70
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region, and any long-term strategy for significant progress will have to tackle this problem seriously. 
Otherwise, the potential for huge strides forward will be jeopardized. 
If Latin America is to experience significantly enhanced growth and development in the coming 
decades it will be critical to build a partnership—in effect, a governance model—that involves a lean, 
efficient government, a socially conscious, responsible, and modern private sector, and a vibrant and 
pragmatic civil society. In addition to the political aspects of governance, our own definition of gov-
ernance comprises of all facets of governance that affect economic management: role and focus of 
governments; importance given to economic and social development by the top political leaders and 
policy makers; delivery of quality and universality of basic public services (law and order, rule of law, 
education and health services); and focus on results and enforcement of accountability. 
Latin America should strive to emulate the four characteristics that have distinguished East Asia 
from other developing regions: 
•	 Sharp and primary focus of political leaders and policy makers alike on economic issues; 
•	 Ability to implement policy decisions; 
•	 Insistence on achievement of results on the ground; and 
•	 Enforcement of accountability.
This can only be accomplished if the region would undertake the required transformation of gov-
ernance. Specifically, Latin America must transform the following ten facets of governance in order 
to kick start the economies to achieve higher economic growth and make the societies much more 
inclusive: 
•	 Make economic and social development the primary focus of the political leaders and policy 
makers, not just in words but also in reality; 
•	 Reverse the deterioration in political governance, while strengthening democratic institutions 
•	 Make governments smarter, more focused and more credible; 
•	 Decentralize, where possible, both the authority and accountability for most public services to 
local bodies as close to the people as possible; 
•	 Modernize and make more effective all institutions involved in economic management; 
•	 Reform the civil service to meet the needs of modern economies and of democratic, more 
open and more inclusive societies; 
•	 Improve the quality, honesty and responsiveness of all public services including the police, 
judiciary, education and health services; 
•	 Actively promote and enforce competitive markets, break down the dominance of entrenched 
vested interests, and prevent capture of state organs by big business; 
•	 Inculcate a code of self discipline and ethical behavior within the business community; and 
•	 Implement agreed policies and priorities, monitor results and enforce accountabilities at all 
levels of government (national, state and municipal). 